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Disclaimers of Contractual Liability and Voluntary Obligations
Michael G Pratt1
Queen’s University
[Forthcoming, Osgoode Hall Law Journal (2014) 51(3)
a special issue in tribute to Professor John McCamus]
--------------I was once a first-year student at Osgoode Hall Law School. That was a long time
ago, but it often occurs to me that a significant part of my life now, all these years
later, is a product of a single, arbitrary decision by an administrator at Osgoode
to place me in the contract law course taught by Professor McCamus.
I could not have known it at the time, but having been in this business for a while
now it is all too clear to me just how rare is the quality of instruction Professor
McCamus provided to his first-year charges in that course on contracts. Several
aspects of the course remain prominent for me. Professor McCamus took us
seriously as thoughtful future participants in the business of making the law. He
engaged with us, pressing us to articulate principles from the cases and to say
whether we thought the courts were getting things right or wrong. We knew we
were part of something more than a merely academic pursuit; that our thoughts
on the often arcane doctrines we were learning could come to really matter in
the world. But I was most struck by what Professor McCamus revealed to us about
the other side of this coin: about what it is to engage in a serious academic study
of the law. I knew there were folks called “law professors” who apparently
understood a lot about the law. But I did not imagine that the law could be
subjected to the same sort of careful, exacting, critical scrutiny that professors in
disciplines like philosophy and the sciences bring to bear on their subjects. And
yet that is exactly what Professor McCamus was doing, and encouraging us to
do, in that first-year classroom.
Here was a brilliant teacher inviting us to see cases as arguments for propositions,
to formulate the bases for those arguments, and to evaluate them. Nor did he
confine himself within the bounds of the subject that he was assigned to teach.
He would routinely venture across the contract boundary into tort, restitution,
property, equity, and everything in-between (the remarkable depth and breadth
of his knowledge was apparent even to a first-year student) to draw contrasts and
I am grateful to participants in the 2014 International Conference on Contracts in Miami
for comments on an earlier draft, to Jamie Cameron for pressing me to clarify certain
points in the paper, and to Warren Whiteknight for his research assistance.
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trace principles to their roots. It was exhilarating. No single course I have ever
taken inspired me more toward a career thinking and writing about the law than
that one. And it is no coincidence that contract law is the field in which I do most
of my research and teaching. I came away from Professor McCamus’s course
with a sense that the law of contract is venerable, fundamental, challenging, and
that it might even be beautiful if one could see the whole of it clearly enough. I
left no other course in law school feeling even remotely the same way (as much
as I enjoyed many of them). Perhaps no other law school subject could leave
such an impression on a student. I will leave that idea alone. But even if contract
law is a jewel in the common law, rare is the teacher who sees it for what it is, and
rarer still is the teacher who inspires his students to see it that way. I am very
grateful to have been taught by one of those teachers.
In this paper I pay tribute to the teacher who taught me the basic principles of
contract law by drawing on those principles to establish certain fundamental
features of contractual liability. Professor McCamus conveyed to his students his
deep respect for the authority of case law, and for legal history (drawing often on
his rich understanding of the history of the common law), but he also taught us
that part of what it is to respect the common law is to call on it to justify itself, and
to scrutinize the answers it gives in an uncompromising way. I hope that some of
the same sense of respect through rigorous scrutiny is reflected in what follows.
------------1. Introduction
Legal orthodoxy has it that contractual obligations are voluntary. It is this that
marks contract off from tort on the map of civil obligations. Whereas tortious duties
arise by operation of law, liability in contract is traditionally understood to be
voluntarily created by the parties themselves.2
What is it that distinguishes an obligation as voluntary? In an attenuated sense
every obligation that is knowingly acquired by an agent who could have avoided
it is a “voluntary” obligation. But this conception of voluntary obligations does not
capture the distinctive and robust sense in which the obligations of contracts are
typically understood to be voluntary. Most legal obligations can be acquired
knowingly or intentionally, after all, including those of the tortious or criminal
variety. The drifter who commits an offence on a bitter winter’s night with the aim
of becoming bound to spend time detained in a warm cell has acquired that
“Broadly-speaking, the law of contract is that part of the law which deals with
obligations which are self-imposed.” P.S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract,
5th ed., (Clarendon, Oxford, 2000) at p.1. “The traditional and still orthodox view of the
nature of contractual obligations is that they are self-imposed promissory obligations.” S.
Smith, Contract Theory (Clarendon, 2004), p. 56. (Emphasis omitted.)
2
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obligation voluntarily, but the obligation is not properly described as a “voluntary”
one.3
The voluntariness of an obligation is a property not of the mental state of the
agent who acquires it but of the conditions under which the obligation obtains
(its triggering conditions).4 The reason the drifter’s duty to submit to incarceration
is not voluntary is that his intention to acquire it played no role in his having
acquired it. What distinguishes an obligation as voluntary is that it obtains only if
the obligor intends to acquire it. A voluntary obligation is one that depends on
the intention of the obligor to take it on. Contractual obligations are voluntary in
this robust sense, then, if and only if the law requires that an agreement is
enforceable as a contract only if the parties intended to create legal obligations
when they made it.5
Is such a requirement part of Canadian law? One need not look far to find judicial
assertions of such a requirement. Indeed, statements to the effect that a contract
is formed only if the parties to intend to create legal obligations (or “legal
relations”) are scattered throughout the law reports.6 Nevertheless, scholars often
doubt that that such a requirement is in fact part of the common law of contract,
in Canada or elsewhere.7 These skeptics point out that the law is more about what
N. MacCormick, “Voluntary Obligations”, in MacCormick, N., Legal Rights and Social
Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy, (Clarendon, 1982), p. 190.
3

Joseph Raz makes this point in his “Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 46 (supp.) (1972), p.79; see also J. Raz “Promises
in Morality and Law” (1982) 95 Harvard LR 916.
4

As I use the term in this paper, “agreement” is to be construed liberally as embracing all
arrangements that evince the kind of consensus necessary to attract the law of contract.
I am concerned in this paper only with the extent to which an intention to create legal
relations must be part of this consensus.
5

The classic statement is that of Atkin LJ in Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571 who wrote of
most domestic agreements that “[t]hey are not contracts … because the parties did not
intend that they should be attended by legal consequences” (at 627). In Carman
Construction Ltd v CPR [1982] S.C.J. No. 49 the Supreme Court of Canada held that a
statement made during a tendering process was not enforceable as a collateral
contract because such contracts “must be established, as in the case of any other
contract, by proof of an intention to contract”. In Matchim v BGI Atlantic Inc. 2010 NLCA
9 the Newfoundland & Labrador Court of Appeal held that “intention to create legal
relations … must be present to constitute an enforceable contract”. In Girouard v Druet
2012 NBCA 40, involving an agreement of purchase and sale made by an exchange of
e-mails, the court approached the question of enforceability by asking “fundamental
question: Was there an intention to create legal relations?”
6

Numerous authors have doubted that there is a genuine requirement of an intention to
create legal relations in contract law, independent of the doctrines of offer, acceptance
7
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judges do than about what they say, and in most contracts cases judges do not
even address the question whether the parties intended their agreement to be
legally binding. Genuine factual inquiries into the issue are quite unusual.8
Of course courts occasionally do purport to refuse to enforce agreements on the
basis that the parties did not intend to be legally bound. Balfour v Balfour9, the
most celebrated example of such a case, has Canadian progeny.10 But the
Balfour line of cases does not silence the skeptics. Certainly it is true that where
friends, intimates, or parties otherwise not at arm’s length make agreements the
courts often refuse to enforce them, ostensibly on the basis that the parties did
not intend their agreement to have legal consequences. But cases like Balfour
provide only ambiguous evidence of the reality of a contractual requirement of
an intention to be legally bound. There are reasons for thinking that the law of
contract ought not to concern itself with strictly domestic and social agreements
that are unrelated to the intentions of the parties.11 So when courts refuse to
enforce such agreements by invoking facts about intentions that they seldom
even investigate in relation to other kinds of agreements, the skeptic responds,
plausibly, that these cases actually have little to do with the intentions of the
and consideration. See, e.g., Williston on Contracts (4th ed, 1990) §3.5; P.S. Atiyah, An
Introduction to the Law of Contract, 5th ed., (Clarendon: Oxford, 2000), pp. 153ff; A. Swan,
Canadian Contract Law, 2nd ed., (LexisNexis: Toronto, 2009) pp.129ff; B.A. Hepple, “The
Intention to Create Legal Relations” (1970) 28 Cambridge LJ 122; A. Robertson, “The Limits
of Voluntariness in Contract” (2005) 29 Melbourne U LR 179. Section 21 of the U.S.
Restatement (Second) of Contract Law provides that no intention to create legal
relations is required to form a contract.
The orthodox explanation for this is that since the law presumes that parties who were
at arm’s length when they negotiated their bargain had the requisite legal intention, triers
of fact are rarely called upon to investigate whether the parties actually had such an
intention. But this orthodox answer will not satisfy the skeptic who doubts that it is a
genuine requirement of a contract that the parties intend to create legal relations. From
the skeptic’s point of view it is more likely that courts rarely assess whether the parties to
an agreement intended to be legally bound because the question is of no legal
relevance, than that it is of fundamental legal importance but there is seldom any doubt
about the matter.
8

Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (C.A.). See also the judgment of Danckwerts and
Fenton Atkinson LJJ in Jones v Padavatton [1969] 2 ALL ER 616.
9

See, e.g., Stenberg v. Steinberg (1963), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 162 (Sask. Q.B.); Buchmaier v.
Buchmaier [1971] B.C.J. No 596 (B.C.C.A.); Rogalsky Estate v Rogalsky [1984] M.J. No. 515;
Decorby v. Decorby Estate (1989), 57 Man R. (2d) 241 (Man. C.A.).
10

See, e.g., J. Poole, Textbook on Contract Law, 11th ed., (OUP, 2012) section 5.2; M.
Chen-Wishart, “Consideration and Serious Intention”, [2009] Singapore J. Legal Studies
434 at 452-53; E. McKendrick, Contract Law: Text, Cases and Materials, (OUP, 2003) at
297-98.
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parties. The “intention to create legal relations” requirement invoked in the Balfour
line of cases is, the skeptics insist, merely a fiction used by judges to limit the extent
to which the law enforces non-arm’s length agreements or agreements that are
outside of the market. It is a tool for “keeping contract in its place”.12
In this paper I invoke a different line of cases against the skeptics and in support
of thesis that parties to a contract must intend to be legally obligated by their
agreement. The cases I invoke are those in which the parties have expressed that
they do not intend their agreement to be legally binding. When parties purport to
remove their agreement from the ambit of the law in this way I will say that they
have issued a “disclaimer”. If a disclaimer clearly expresses the intentions of both
parties it will virtually always be effective in precluding either party from enforcing
the agreement as a contract. Contractual obligations are, in other words,
“disclaimer-sensitive”: they do not obtain if the parties have included a disclaimer
in their agreement. The decision in Rose & Frank Co v JR Crompton & Bros Ltd, in
which the House of Lords refused to enforce an agreement that included an
unambiguous “honour” clause, is the best-known authority for this proposition.13
Disclaimer-sensitivity is a striking feature of contractual obligations that stands in
need of explanation. Why should parties who make a bargain while disavowing
an intention to acquire a legal obligation not acquire one, if making a bargain
otherwise attracts such an obligation? What accounts for the normative
difference that disclaimers make? I argue in what follows that the most plausible
explanation is that contractual obligations are voluntary. I argue, in other words,
that if contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive then they must also be
voluntary.
2. Voluntariness and the “Objective” Approach to Intentions
Before examining the relationship between disclaimer-sensitivity and voluntariness
I address a preliminary matter. Assume for the moment that there is a genuine
contractual requirement that the parties must intend to create legal obligations.
The “intentions” with which such a requirement is concerned will not always be
those that the parties actually possessed. Here, as elsewhere in contract law, one
S. Hedley, “Keeping Contract in its Place—Balfour v Balfour and the Enforcement of
Informal Agreements” (1985) 5 OJLS 391.
12

Rose & Frank Co v JR Crompton & Bros Ltd. [1924] UKHL 2. See also Ferrera v Littlewoods
Pools [1998] EWCA Civ 618; Halloway v Cuozzo (1999) EWCA Civ 746. Disclaimers are often
incorporated into so-called “comfort letters”. When they are clear and unambiguous
they render these letters unenforceable: see Toronto Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments
Ltd. (Trustee of) (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 417 (Ont. C.A.).
13
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will sometimes be deemed to have intended what others reasonably inferred
from one’s words and deeds that one intended. The law will substitute a person’s
“objective” intentions for his actual intentions where this is required to ensure that
contracts fulfill their function of permitting parties to order their affairs in reliance
on them.
Despite some dramatic remarks by some judges and scholars to the contrary,14 I
suspect that this substitution does not seriously undermine the thesis that
contractual obligations are voluntary. In the first place, bargaining parties are
generally adept at interpreting each other’s intentions. “Objective” intent is
usually excellent evidence of actual intent, and the substitution by a court of
“objective” intention for a divergent actual intention is therefore rare.
More fundamentally, the rule that an “objective” intention to be legally bound
will suffice to generate contractual liability, far from being a repudiation of the
idea that contractual obligations are voluntary, is in fact evidence that the law
takes this idea seriously. The rule protects promisees by permitting them to rely on
their own reasonable assessment of whether they have a contract with the
promisor – that is, of whether the requirements of contract formation have been
satisfied. The reason that a contract may be created by a party who displays an
“objective” intention to be legally obligated is precisely that contracts can be
formed only by parties who subjectively intend to be legally obligated. The law
construes a merely apparent intention as genuine intention just insofar as that is
necessary to protect a promisee in his reasonable inference that the promisor had
the requisite genuine intention. The rule that an “objective” intention to be legally
obligated is sufficient is therefore not a fundamental rule of contract formation.
Rather, it is a rule about how the basic requirement of actual legal intention can
be satisfied in certain exceptional cases.
I do not pretend to have reconciled objectivity and voluntariness with this brief
argument; the problem of subjectivity and objectivity in contract formation is a
vexed one that is beyond my scope here.15 It is enough for my purposes to show
“A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent
of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain
acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known
intent.” Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). “Every law
student is taught from his earliest days that contractual intent is not really what it seems.
Actual subjective intent is normally irrelevant. It is the appearance, the manifestation of
intent that matters.” P. Atiyah, Essays on Contract (1986) at 21. See also A Robertson, “The
Limits of Voluntariness in Contract”, supra. note 6 at 187ff.
14

For a sampling of the scholarly debate, see J. Spencer, "Signature, Consent, and the
Rule in L'Estrange v Graucob" [1973] CLJ 104; W. Howarth, "The Meaning of Objectivity in
Contract" (1987) 103 LQR 274; D. Goddard, "The Myth of Subjectivity" (1987) Current Legal
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6

that objectivity is not the obvious and conclusive answer to voluntariness that it is
often taken to be. In what follows I use the word “intention” in an undifferentiated
way to refer to whichever kind of intention, actual or “objective,” the law is
concerned with under the circumstances. An obligation can thus be “voluntary”
in the robust sense I have defined even though it can obtain in the absence of
an actual intention to acquire it. For the reasons I have outlined, I think the nexus
between “objective” and actual intention in the law of contract is such as to
justify using the term “voluntary” to refer to contractual obligations if they depend
on either phenomenon. But nothing in my paper turns on the use of this term, and
if the reader prefers, he or she may substitute “‘voluntary’” (with scare quotes) for
“voluntary” in what follows.
3. Explaining Disclaimer-Sensitivity
Rose & Frank and cases like it establish that parties who qualify their agreements
with a disclaimer thereby avoid contractual liability. In other words, contractual
obligations are disclaimer-sensitive. I will argue that this feature of contractual
obligations can be explained in a plausible way only if contractual obligations
are voluntary. I argue, in other words, that if contractual obligations are
disclaimer-sensitive then they must also be voluntary.
The truth of this claim is not obvious, but it is sometimes assumed that it is. Courts
and commentators often invoke cases like Rose & Frank in support of the view
that there is a requirement of legal intention in contract formation, i.e., that
contractual obligations are voluntary.16 Some of these authors seem to assume
that voluntariness can be inferred from disclaimer-sensitivity in the following simple
way. A disclaimer is evidence that the parties had no intention to generate legal
obligations when making their agreement. A disclaimer prevents an agreement
from generating a contractual obligation. Therefore agreements generate

Problems 263; D. McLauchlan, “Objectivity in Contract” (2005) 24 U. Queensland Law
Rev. 479; B. Coote, “Reflections on Intention in the Law of Contract” (2006) NZ Law Review
183.
Many of those text-writers from Commonwealth jurisdictions who take the view that
contracts require an intention to create legal relations discuss Rose & Frank in connection
with that requirement, and Professor McCamus is no exception: see J. McCamus, The
Law of Contracts, 2nd ed., (Irwin Law: Toronto, 2012) chapter 4. See also E. Peel, Treitel’s
The Law of Contract, 12th ed., (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2007) at 177; B. MacDougall,
Introduction to Contracts (LexisNexis: Toronto, 2007) at 48; J. Beatson, Anson’s Law of
Contract, 28th ed., (Oup, 2002) at 71; M. Chen-Wishart, Contract Law, (OUP, 2005) at 114.
16
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contractual obligations only if they are made with an intention to create legal
obligations.17
This simple inference from disclaimer-sensitivity to voluntariness is too quick. It
presupposes that disclaimers preclude contractual obligations in virtue of their
being evidence that the parties did not intend to create legal obligations. If
disclaimers were evidence of this fact and of no other fact, then an inference
from disclaimer-sensitivity to voluntariness would go through. But disclaimers
reveal not only that the parties intend to create a legal obligation – they also
reveal that the parties intended not to create a legal obligation. These two facts
are not the same. That the parties to an agreement intend not to create legal
obligations entails that they do not intend to create legal obligations, but the
entailment does not go in the other direction. Imagine two parties making an
agreement who are unaware that there is any law relating to the making and
keeping of agreements. Corbin wrote of an agreement to trade a horse for a cow
by “two ignorant persons who never heard of a legal relation and who do not
know that society offers any kind of a remedy for the enforcement of such an
agreement”.18 These farmers have no intention to create legal obligations, but
they do not intend their agreement not to create such obligations.
In light of this we can see why voluntariness cannot be inferred from disclaimersensitivity in a straightforward way. Disclaimers reveal two distinct facts about the
intentions of the parties, and it is not obvious which of them the law responds to
when it refuses to enforce disclaimer-qualified agreements. Are such agreements
unenforceable because of the intention (to be legally bound) that disclaimers
reveal to be absent, or because of the intention (not to be legally bound) that
they reveal to be present?
I will argue that the latter answer is not plausible. If I am right about this then it
must follow that it is the absence of an intention to be legally bound to which the
law responds when it refuses to enforce an agreement that is qualified by a
disclaimer – that is, contractual obligations must be voluntary. In other words, if I
am right then it follows from the disclaimer-sensitivity of contractual obligations
that they are voluntary.
The skeptic will agree with me that a simple inference from disclaimer-sensitivity
to voluntariness is impermissible, but he will resist my claim that disclaimersensitivity can be plausibly explained only if contractual liability is voluntary. At
This inference is rarely made explicit but it is the most plausible way to make sense of
those who invoke Rose & Frank as authority for (or even as pertaining to) the voluntariness
of contractual obligations.
17
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A Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (1st ed, 1950) § 34, at 135.
8

least one skeptic has advanced an argument along these lines. In a well-known
paper Stephen Hedley argued that there is no “necessary connection” between
disclaimer cases like Rose & Frank and a requirement that contracting parties
intend to create legal obligations.19 While these cases “mesh perfectly” with such
a requirement, they do not provide any independent evidence of such a
requirement since “the fact that a rule of law may be excluded by the intentions
of the parties does not show that the rule itself is based on those intentions”.20
Hedley’s point appears to be that these cases also mesh perfectly with a rule
permitting parties to intentionally exclude contractual liability by means of a
disclaimer. On this view, Rose & Frank and its ilk are cases about the legal efficacy
of disclaimers and not about the intention to create legal obligations.
Hedley does not develop his objection any further than this, apparently regarding
it as more or less obvious. In what follows I argue that it is mistaken. There is no
plausible way to justify cases like Rose & Frank, which establish that contractual
obligations are disclaimer-sensitive, unless such obligations are also voluntary.
4. Voluntariness or Avoidability?
Let C be the set of necessary and sufficient conditions (c1, c2, c3 ... cn) under which
the parties to an agreement acquire an enforceable contractual obligation (O)
to adhere to the agreement. C includes, for example, conditions requiring that
the parties provide consideration, that the agreement be sufficiently complete
and certain, etc. Now imagine two parties A and B who negotiate an agreement
with each other in two possible worlds. In the first world, W1, all of the conditions in
C are satisfied and the parties acquire O. The second world, W2, is the nearest
possible world to W1 in which the parties qualify their agreement by a disclaimer.
Since O is disclaimer-sensitive the parties acquire O in W1 but not in W2. One or
more of the antecedents of O (c1, c2, c3, … cn) is not satisfied in W2. What is it
about O that explains why our parties acquire it in the first world but not in the
second? By virtue of what feature of contractual obligations is this difference to
be explained?
From our earlier discussion of what disclaimers reveal about party intentions, two
possible explanations present themselves. The first is that contractual obligations
are voluntary. On this view C includes a voluntariness condition, c v, by virtue of
which O obtains only if the parties intended to create legal obligations when they
made their agreement. I will refer to this view as the “Voluntariness” thesis:
S. Hedley, “Keeping Contract in its Place—Balfour v Balfour and the Enforcement of
Informal Agreements” (1985) 5 OJLS 391 at 399.
19

20

Ibid.
9

Voluntariness Thesis: The law enforces an agreement as a contract only if
the parties intended their agreement to create legal obligations.
The second possible explanation for disclaimer-sensitivity is that contractual
obligations do not depend on an intention to create legal obligations but that
such obligations are precluded if the parties intend that their agreement is not to
create legal obligations. On this view cv is not included in C, but C includes an
“avoidability” condition, ca, by virtue of which O is not acquired if the parties
intend to avoid becoming legally obligated by their agreement. I call this the
“Avoidability” thesis:
Avoidability Thesis: The fact that the parties to an agreement did not intend
to become legally obligated by their agreement is irrelevant to whether it
ought to be enforced, but the fact that they intended to avoid becoming
legally obligated by it is a sufficient reason not to enforce it.
This thesis is presupposed by section 21 of the American Restatement 2nd of
Contracts, which provides that “Neither real nor apparent intention that a
promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a
manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may
prevent the formation of a contract.”
Contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive. It follows from this that either the
Voluntariness Thesis is true or the Avoidability Thesis is true. (They cannot both be
true.) I proceed now to argue that the Avoidability Thesis is false.
5. A Reductio of the Avoidability Thesis
According to the Avoidability Thesis contractual obligations are avoidable but
not voluntary. I want to argue that this thesis is not plausible. My argument takes
the form of a reductio. The Avoidability Thesis implies, first, that A and B acquire O
in W1 even if they did not intend to acquire it, and, second, that the fact that A
and B intended to avoid acquiring O in W2 is a sufficient reason for not imposing
O on them in W2. The Avoidability Thesis therefore implies that the following
proposition (P) is true:
P: The fact that A and B intended to avoid acquiring O when making their
agreement in W2 is a sufficient reason to preclude them from acquiring O
despite that their having made the same agreement with no such intention
in W1 was sufficient to justify imposing O on them.

10

I claim that this proposition is implausible. The fact that A and B intended to avoid
acquiring O when making their agreement in W2 cannot be a sufficient reason to
preclude them from acquiring O, if their having made the same agreement was
a sufficient reason for imposing O on them in W1.
Unless an obligation is voluntary then the fact that an agent intends to avoid
acquiring it when he behaves in a certain manner is irrelevant to whether he will
acquire that obligation when he behaves in that manner. The agent’s intention
to avoid acquiring the obligation is normatively inert, in the sense specified by the
following principle:
Inertness Principle: My plea that in doing some act β (e.g., making an
agreement with you) I intended to avoid acquiring an obligation to you to
do φ (e.g., to fulfill the terms of the agreement) cannot excuse my not
doing φ if my doing β with no such intention is sufficient to obligate me to
you to do φ.
I take the truth of this principle to be more or less obvious. If I do β with no intention
of acquiring (or avoiding) an obligation to you to φ, and I thereby acquire an
obligation to you to φ, then that obligation is presumably grounded in some
interest you have in my doing φ after having done β. And the normative force of
this interest cannot be reduced by my intention or desire that it be reduced. If by
taking another’s property one becomes obligated to return it, then if I take your
bicycle I thereby acquire an obligation to return it even if I intended to avoid such
an obligation when I took it.
If the Inertness Principle is true then proposition P must be false, and since P is
entailed by the Avoidability Thesis, the latter thesis is also false. Since the
Avoidability Thesis is false, moreover, the must be true.
6. The Internalization Strategy
One way to defend the Avoidability Thesis against my reductio is to argue that
when the law gives effect to a disclaimer it is simply giving effect to the parties’
agreement. On this view the law enforces agreements as contracts even if the
parties do not intend to be legally bound by them, and disclaimers are terms in
agreements, enforced like any other term. In other words, disclaimers are internal
to agreements and disclaimer-sensitivity follows from the law’s respect for
agreements.21 This view finds its most authoritative expression in the comments to
I argued that the Avoidability Principle entails proposition P, which falls foul of the
Inertness Principle. The internalization strategy avoids this reductio by denying that the
Avoidability Principle entails proposition P. According to that proposition, A and B did the
21
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section 21 of the Restatement, which explain that “[p]arties to what would
otherwise be a bargain and a contract sometimes agree that their legal relations
are not to be affected… such a term is respected by the law like any other
term.”22
The first difficulty with the internalization strategy is that it seems to be incoherent.
It holds that the law gives effect to disclaimers because they are terms in
agreements, and agreements are enforceable. But to give effect to a disclaimer
is to render unenforceable the agreement of which it is a part. The internalization
strategy therefore implies, incoherently, that an agreement with a disclaimer in it
is unenforceable only to the extent that it is enforceable.23
Even if this logical problem can be remedied, the internalization strategy seems
to beg the question that it seeks to answer, namely, why the law gives effect to
disclaimers. The strategy purports to explain the legal force of disclaimers by
internalizing them to agreements and invoking the enforceability of agreements
as an explanation. On this view agreements are enforced, and disclaimers have
legal effect because they are terms in agreements. This suggests a picture of an
agreement as a kind of enforcing container that confers legal effect on any terms
that are poured into it. But this is not quite right. The law does not enforce terms
(merely) because they are contained within agreements; it enforces terms
because they comprise agreements. An agreement consists in its terms, and the
law enforces agreements just insofar as it enforces the terms that comprise them.
The internalization strategy is plausible, therefore, only if disclaimers are terms of a
kind that the law enforces. But disclaimers seem very different from the kinds of
terms that render agreements enforceable.
same thing (β) in W1 and W2 – they made the same agreement – albeit with different
intentions. According to the internalization strategy, however, A and B did not do the
same thing in W1 and W2, for if disclaimers form part of the agreements that they qualify,
then A and B did not make the same agreement in W2 that they made in W1. In W2 the
parties made their agreement with the mutual intention that it not be legally binding,
and that mutual intention became part of their agreement in W2.
See also S. Smith, Contract Theory, (OUP, 204) at 212-13; M. Furmston, Cheshire, Fiftoot,
and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 14th ed., (Butterworths: London, 2001) at 127; P.S. Atiyah,
An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 5th ed., (OUP, 2000) at 153.
22

It may be urged that this charge of incoherence is mistaken because a disclaimer does
not render unenforceable the entire agreement of which it is a part. Rather, it renders
unenforceable all the terms in the agreement other than the disclaimer itself. But this
move will not work. The internalization strategy insists that a disclaimer is to be treated like
any other term in an enforceable agreement. But if a disclaimer is treated as enforceable
only to the extent that the other terms are enforceable, then the internalization strategy
implies, absurdly, that a disclaimer renders all the other terms unenforceable just to the
extent that all those terms are enforceable.
23
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Agreements that are enforceable as contracts consist of terms that supply the
agreements with content by specifying the states of affairs that fulfill or violate
them. These terms are of three kinds. The first are performance-terms that stipulate
what the agreement requires of the parties by way of performance. The second
are warranty-terms that provide that if certain facts not related to the actions of
the parties do not obtain then the agreement is violated (e.g., a term warranting
the provenance of the goods sold). Conditions are a third kind of term. A
condition specifies the circumstances under which other terms become or cease
to be part of the agreement.
Disclaimers are unlike any of these three kinds of ordinary terms. Disclaimers
express the parties’ intentions with respect to the legal force of their agreement.
They do not supply the agreement with content by specifying the circumstances
under which it is violated. Rather, disclaimers purport to deprive the agreement
of its status as a contract; they aim to determine its status in law rather than its
scope as an agreement. “This is a (morally) binding agreement,” declares a
disclaimer, “but it is not a contract”.
This difference between ordinary terms and disclaimers is a problem for the
internalization strategy. An agreement comprising ordinary terms is enforceable,
and therefore agreements are enforceable in virtue of their having contents that
define the circumstances under which they are violated. The contractual status
of an agreement is, in other words, a function of its being an agreement capable
of being fulfilled or violated as an agreement. Since disclaimers do not define the
contents of an agreement in this way, their status as terms in an agreement
cannot explain their legal force because they are not the kind of terms that make
agreements enforceable. By the internalization strategy’s own lights the law
respects agreements not as juristic acts or intentional exercises of legal power but
as pre-legal arrangements by which the parties mutually commit themselves to
ensuring that certain states of affairs obtain. There is no reason to think that
because it lends its force to such arrangements therefore the law also gives effect
to declarations in such arrangements that they are not to have contractual status.
To summarize, the claim that disclaimers are “respected by the law just like any
other term” is either mistaken or question-begging. If the claim is that disclaimers
are just like any other term, it is mistaken. Conceived as terms, disclaimers are
status-determining rather than content-providing. If the claim is rather that the law
treats disclaimers just like any other term by affording them the same legal effect,
then it generates the very question that it purports to answer, namely, why does
the law give effect to disclaimers?
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7. Conclusion
Rose & Frank and its progeny establish that contractual obligations are disclaimersensitive. This striking feature of contractual obligations is often discussed by text
writers and judges in connection with a requirement that contracting parties must
intend to create legal obligations. The precise nature of the relationship between
this requirement and disclaimer-sensitivity is, however, rarely examined or made
explicit. If the requirement of legal intention were manifestly part of the law of
contract – if it were axiomatic that contractual obligations are voluntary – then
disclaimer-sensitivity could be explained as a corollary of that feature. But
voluntariness is a disputed characteristic of contractual obligations. Skeptics of
the Voluntariness Thesis abound. Few, however, are those who would deny that
contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive. It would be fruitful, therefore, to
be able to derive the disputed requirement that contracting parties must intend
to create legal obligations from the settled premise that contractual obligations
are disclaimer-sensitive. That is what I have attempted to do here.
It is sometimes assumed that the voluntariness of contractual obligations follows
straightforwardly from the fact that they are disclaimer-sensitive. I have argued
that no such straightforward inference is possible. The relationship between these
two features is more complex than previous writers appear to have appreciated.
I have argued that if contractual obligations are disclaimer-sensitive then either
the Voluntariness Thesis is true or the Avoidability Thesis is true; that the Avoidability
Thesis cannot be sustained; and that therefore the Voluntariness Thesis is true.
I first encountered the idea of disclaimer-sensitivity – the notion that contractual
obligations can be avoided by disavowing an intention to create them – as a firstyear student in Professor McCamus’s classroom. I like to think that my old teacher
will find my arguments in this paper persuasive. But more than that, I hope that he
will take some pride in having helped to inspire in one of his students a passion for
the law of contract sufficient to cause him still to be writing and thinking about its
foundations all these years later.

14

